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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MORTGAGABILITY OF RENTS AND PROF.ITS,
APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVERS
I. THE VALIDrrY OP TM MORTGAGE.
The prevailing view,' and the one which has always been adopted
in Washington, is that a mortgage upon realty creates merely
a lien thereon and does not pass title thereto, either before or after
condition broken, Hyde v. Heller;2 Dane v. Dansel;3 Fischer v.
Woodruff;4 this view being codified by an act of the territorial
legislature of 1869' providing that
"A mortgage of real property shall not be deemed a con-
veyance so as to enable the owner of the mortgage to re-
cover possession of the real property, without a fore-
closure and sale according to law."
Prior to the enactment of that statute and at all times since,
there has been in effect another statute relating to the grounds
for the appointment of a receiver,6 which, so far as material here,
provides that
"A receiver may be appointed by the court in the follow-
ing cases.
4. In an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure of a
mortgage and the sale of the mortgaged property, when
it appears that such property is in danger of being lost,
removed, or materially injured, (or when such property
is insufficient to discharge the debt, to secure the appli-
cation of the rents and profits accruing, before a sale
can be had.)"
By its decisions in Norfor v. Busby 7 Euphrat v. Morrson;8
and Collins v. Gross;9 repeatedly followed in later cases, the Su-
preme Court of Washington held that that portion in parenthesis
of the act of 185410 was umpliedly repealed by the passage of the
act of 1869,11 and that as a consequence a receiver should not
be appointed, to secure the application of the rents and profits
before a sale could be had, on the ground that the property was
insufficient to discharge the debt. That that was the extent of
the question then before the Court in the Norfor case, and no
more, is revealed by an examination of the briefs, which show that
the rents and profits were not specifically pledged, and that the
only ground asserted -in the affidavits in. support of the applica-
tion for a receiver was the inadequacy of the security.
13 Jones on Mortgages (8th ed.) sec. 1935, 1 Tardy's Smith on Re-
ceivers (2d ed. 1920) sec. 239, page 553.
'10 Wash. 586, 39 Pac. 249 (1895).
'23 Wash. 379, 63 Pac. 268 (1900).
1 25 Wash. 67, 64 Pac. 923 (1901).
'Sess. L. 1869, c. 46 Sec. 498, p. 130; Rem. C. S. 804, P C. 7530.
OSess. L. 1854, e. 13 Sec. 171, p. 162; Rem. C. S. 741, P. c. 8414.
719. Wash. 450, 53 Pac. 715 (1898).
'39 Wash. 311, 81 Pac. 695 (1905).151 Wash. 516, 99 Pac. 573 (1909).
"0 Supra, note 6.
n Supra, note 5.
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It is true that in its decision the -Court also said "The statute
(Rem. C. S. 804, P C. 7530) is also expressive of the public policy
of the state vesting the right of possession in the mortgagor abso-
lutely until a decree and sale," thereafter quoting portions of the
opinions in Teal v. Walker;12 Couper v. Shirley;" and Wager v.
Stone;14 involving statutes similar to the act of 1869.15 If the
opinion, referring to the public policy therein mentioned and the
cases quoted, was ever susceptible of a construction that a receiver
may never be appointed in a foreclosure action until a decree and
sale, and that a mortgagee is never entitled to the rents and profits
until he gets possession by such a decree, it was based upon pure
dictum. This conclusion seems to follow from the opinion ex-
pressed in the subsequent case of Euphrat v. Morrtson.16
The same thing may be said of Teal v. Walker, 7 which was mere-
ly an action to recover damages which the mortgagee claimed he
sustained by reason of the refusal of the mortgagor to surrender
possession after default. The mortgage did not pledge the rents
but merely provided for such surrender. The mortgagee took no
effectual steps to regain possession, nor were any equitable prin-
ciples invoked, the naked question being the relative rights of
the mortgagor and mortgagee to rents and profits of the mortgaged
properties while they were in possession of the mortgagor, and be-
fore the mortgagee, by suit or otherwise, sought to obtain posses-
sion. In its decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
quotes its opinion in the case of Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co.,'8
as holding that, as the mortgagee was not entitled to possession,
(by reason of a Nebraska statute similar to Rem. C. S. 804, P C.
7530), he had no right to the rents and profits. In the Kountze
case the Court expressed similar views upon the question of public
policy as those expressed by the Court in the Teal case and quoted
in the Norfor case by the Washington Court, but further expressly
recognized the equitable doctrine that rents and profits might be
applied to the satisfaction of a debt, saying-
"Courts of equity always have the power where the
debtor is insolvent, and the mortgaged property is an
insufficient security for the debt, and there is good cause
to believe that it will be wasted or deteriorated in the
hands of the mortgagor to take charge of the property
by means of a receiver and preserve not only the corpus,
but the rents and profits for the sattsfacton of the debt."
(Italics ours)
This excerpt from the Kountze case was quoted with approval
in Grant v. Phoen=x Life Ins. Co.,19 decided subsequently to the
"111 U. S. 242, 28 L. ed. 415, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 420 (1883)
75 Fed. 168 (1896).
1436 Mich. 364 (1877).
Supra, note 5.
1 Supra, note 8.
1 Supra, note 12.
"107 U. S. 378, 27 L. ed. 609, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 911 (1882).
121 U. S. 105, 117, 30 L. ed. 905, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141 (1886).
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Teal case.
The opinion in the case of Wager v. Stone,0 also cited in the
Norfor case by the Washington Court, does not disclose that the
receiver's appointment was based upon any equitable principles,
nor that the rents were expressly mortgaged, the Court stating
that, "The rents and profits of the land do not enter into or form
any part of the security " And that same Court in the subsequent
case of Michigan Trust Co. v. Lansing Lumber Co.,21 said
" and while we think it within the power of the
parties to stipulate that such possession and management
of the business may precede foreclosure yet such
power should not be exercised except in a case where
the right is clearly given by the engagement of the
party 222
An examination of the more recent cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Washington sheds little light upon this doctrine
of public policy as expressed by the earlier decisions. In Western
Loan & Building Co. v. Mifflin,2" the mortgage foreclosed covered
not only the real estate but also the rents, issues and profits. The
contest arose between the general receiver of the mortgagor, and
the mortgagee, after a deficiency judgment was taken by the
latter, as to which was entitled to the net proceeds of the rentals
remaining in the hands of the special receiver appointed in the
foreclosure action. The Court held that the provision covering
the rents, in the mortgage, and an assignment of the rents taken
contemporaneously with the mortgage, being silent as to how they
should be applied, was not inconsistent with an intent that the
rents should be applied only to maintenance of the property and
prevention of waste pending foreclosure, in so far as the rights
of the mortgagee were concerned. Then, after quoting that por-
tion of the opinion in the Norfor ease, wherein this doctrine of
public policy is mentioned, the Court said. "Any other construc-
tion of these mortgage and assignment provisions, it would seem,
should not be favored by the court in the light of the law as
above noticed." It should be noted, however, that the Court,
in its opinion, also stated that
"The foreclosure decree did not make any adjudication
touching the disposition of the rents and income of the
property pending the foreclosure action, that is, there was
no foreclosure against that fund." (Italics ours)
In State ex rel. All.en v. Sup. Court for King County,24 a trustee,
operating under appointment by the mortgagor and the first mort-
gagee of hotel property, to collect rents and apply them to certain
purposes, including the payment of taxes and interest on a see-
2 Supra, note 14.
'a103 Mich. 392, 61 N. W 668 (1894).
= Cases collected in 4 A. L. R. 1405 and 55 id. 1020.
23162 Wash. 33, 297 Pac. 743 (1931).
2-"164 Wash. 515, 2 Pac. (2d) 1095 (1931) noted in 6 Wash. Law
Rev. 177.
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ond mortgage, was held entitled to the rents as against the re-
ceiver of an absconding tenant of the mortgagor, the Court ex-
pressly stating that under the state of facts there presented, Rem.
C. S. 804, (P C. 7530) was not applicable.
Commenting upon the Mifflin case, supra, the Court said
"The mortgagee did not, in the foreclosure action, seek
to establish its lien upon any funds in the hands of the
special receiver, but took simply a decree of foreclosure
in the ordinary form. The case might well have been de-
ctded upon the ground that the mortgagee had waived
its right to the fund by neglecting to seek to enforce some
lien thereon in the foreclosure action and have its rights
adjucated by the decree rendered therein. " (Italics
ours)
That statement, concurred in by a majority of the justices,
coupled with the strong and terse dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Millard, might easily lead one to believe that the Supreme Court
of Washington is not disposed to regard the public policy of this
state as precluding the parties from expressly stipulating for the
application of rents and profits to the mortgage indebtedness, at
least under certain circumstances, if it were not for the recent case
of State ex rel. Gunnn, Inc., et at. v. Sup. Court For King County
et al.,2 5 wherein a mortgage of certain real and personal property,
executed to secure the payment of a bond issue maturing at vary-
ing dates over a period of years, specifically provided that the
rents, issues and profits from the mortgaged property were mort-
gaged to secure the payment of the mortgage debt, that the mort-
gagor, until the breach of any of the conditions of the bonds or
mortgage, would be permitted to enjoy and use the mortgaged
rents, issues and profits, and that upon commencement of judicial
proceedings to enforce the rights of the mortgagee and bondholders,
the mortgagee would be entitled, as a matter of right, to the ap-
pointment of a receiver of the mortgaged property, "and of the
earnings, income, rents, issues and profits thereof, pending such
proceedings." Upon default in payment on the bonds, the mort-
gagee commenced an action for the foreclosure of the mortgage
and the appointment of a special receiver pending foreclosure and
sale, alleging that the rents and profits were being collected and
dissipated by defendant mortgagor and that the same would be
lost as security unless such receiver was appointed. The superior
court entered an order appointing a receiver to collect the rents
and profits, apply same upon the necessary charges and expenses
incidental to the preservation of the mortgaged property, and
hold the balance thereof subject to the further order of the Court.
On petition for review, the Supreme Court remanded the cause,
with direction to vacate the order, (Tolman, C. J., dissenting),
using the following language
"The facts in the case at bar present the question of
70 Wash. Dec. 420, 16 Pac. (2d) 831 (1932)
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the enforceability of an executory agreement to place the
mortagee in possession of the mortgaged property prior to
foreclosure and sale. That question is foreclosed by
Western Loan & Building Co. V. Mifflin,26 supra."
On the authority of the Allen case, supra, and 31 light of the
foregoing discussion, it is conceived that the Court may well have
reached a contrary result. In no case cited as authority does it
appear that the two controlling elements in the Gwnn case were
present, these being specific mortgage of the rents, issues and
profits, and specific attempt to subject them to foreclosure. This
contention is further strengthened by a consideration of the dis-
senting opinion in the Allen case which seems nearly the same
as the reasoning of the majority in the Guninn case. In his dissent,
Justice Millard, after setting forth the provisions of Rem. C. S.
804 (P C. 7530), continued.
"The foregoing declares as the public policy of this
state that the mortgagee has no right by virtue of the
mortgage, either prior or subsequent to default, to the
possession of the mortgaged property, that the right of
possession until foreclosure and sale remains in the mort-
gagor and his successors in interest. There is no pro-
vision in the statute making it optional with the parties
whether a mortgagee shall be given the right to posses-
Sion.")
It is stated in Corpus Juris that "Rents and profits are as
much property as the estate out of which they arise and as such
they are the subject of a mortgage."2 7 Clark in his work on
Receivers, states that "In New York State and other states where
the legal title remains in the mortgagor until foreclosure and
sale, the legal right to the rents as well as to the possession con-
tinues in the mortgagor until foreclosure and sale. 'But when
default has been made in the condition of the mortgage, the mort-
gagee becomes at once entitled to a foreclosure of the mortgage
and a sale of the mortgaged premises. This process requires time,
and on general principles of equity, the court may make the de-
cree, when obtained, relate back to the time of the commencement
of the action, and where necessary for the security of the mort-
gage debt, may appoint a receiver of the rents and profits accruing
in the meantinie, thus anticipating the decree and sale,' -'8 citing
Hollenbeck v. Donnell.29  See also, Lyng v. Marcus;30 In re
Bros.; 3' Moncreff v. Hare;32 Handman v. Volk.13 It has even
been suggested that where the mortgagor has covenanted with and
"Supra, note 23.
-'41 C. J. 375.
2 Clark On Receivers (2d ed. -1929) 1381.
94 N. Y. 342, 346 (1884).
118 N. Y. S. 1056 (1909).
=254 Fed. 664 (1918).
38 Colo. 221, 87 Pac. 1082, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1001 (1906).
30 Ky. 818, 99 S. W 660 (1907).
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authorized the mortgagee to appoint a receiver, in case of default,
of the rents and proceeds of the mortgaged estate, for the better
security of the mortgage debt and the interest thereon, the receiver.
being appointed by the mortgagee under the power contained in
the mortgage, is in possession of the premises as agent, not of the
mortgagee, but of the mortgagor, since the mortgagee himself acts
in the capacity and sustains the relation of agent of the mortgagor
in making the appointment.
4
II. APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVERS.
Even though it be assumed, however, that a specific pledge of
rents and profits might be valid, it does not follow that the refusal
of the Court in the Gwmn case to appoint a receiver was not justi-
fiable. In Tiffany on Real Property, it is said that
"The general rule, in reference to the appointment of a
receiver, in the course of a foreclosure proceeding, to se-
questrate the rents and profits, is that this relief will be
given when the security is of at least doubtful sufficiency,
and the person or persons liable for the debt are insolvent.
And conversely that a receiver will not be appointed for
this purpose unless both of these conditions exist ))35
And in Lck v. Strom,36 it appears to be established that to en-
title a mortgagee to a receiver, it must be shown that waste is
being committed, that the property is an inadequate security for
the mortgage debt, and that a deficiency judgment could not be
obtained, or that those liable for the mortgage debt are insolvent,
while in Nielson v. Heald,7 it is stated that
"To obtain the appointment of a receiver, the mortgagee
must show not only that the security is inadequate and the
debtor insolvent, but also that his security is becoming
impaired through the wrongful failure of the mortgagor,
or his successor in interest, to protect the property from
waste. ' 38
See also Newman v. Van Northunck;39 Equitable Savings & Loan
Associatton v. Anderson.40 Tested by the foregoing, there was
nothing in the facts established to authorize the appointment of a
receiver. Defendant, owner and mortgagor, effectually purged
itself of the charge of waste. Not only had it paid the taxes due
but it had set aside a sum to pay the taxes coming due. It main-
tained all insurance necessary to protect the property and the
bondholders. It maintained the building (an apartment house)
and equipment in good repair. Disinterested witnesses testified
to the high character of the management service. In Moore v. Twin
City Ice C S. Co.," it is stated that waste is
31 High On Receivers (4th ed. 1910) sec. 652, page 803, and cases cited.
' 3 Tiffany On Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 2442.60134 Wash. 490, 236 Pac. 88 (1925).
3, 151 Minn. 181, 186 N. W 229 (1922)
"C Oases collected in 26 A. L. R. 33, 36 id. 609 and 55 id. 533.
3995 Wash. 489, 164 Pac. 61 (1917).
41113 Wash. 420, 194 Pac. 387 (1920).
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"an unreasonable and improper use and abuse, misman-
agement, or omission of duty touching real estate by one
rightfully in possession, which results in substantial injury
thereto."
Further, the property appears to have been an entirely adequate
security for the indebtedness, even allowing a very substantial
amount for depreciation and decreased costs. If the suit results
in a decree of foreclosure and sale thereunder the mortgagee will
have acquired a property having a value in excess of the mortgage
indebtedness. Neither was a charge of insolvency made out. That
the mortgagor was a corporation actively engaged in business in
Seattle, and entirely solvent, appears from the affidavit of its
president. The power of equity to appoint receivers is a dis-
cretionary power to be exercised with great caution. It follows,
therefore, that a clause in a mortgage authorizing the appointment
of a receiver when default is made or otherwise, conveys no ab-
solute right to the appointment by the court. In Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Broecker,42 it is said that
"The appointment of a receiver is a remedy, it is part of
the procedure of Courts of Chancery to conserve and en-
force equitable rights, but it is not an equity in itself, and
parties cannot bargain concerning the exercise of its juris-
diction. Such provisions, no doubt, may be entitled to
some weight upon the application, but a court of equity
will not enforce them where it would be inequitable or
unconscionable to do so."
III. CONCLUSION.
By way of summary, it is submitted that the law in Washington,
as presently constituted, is embodied in the following propositions.
1. That a specific pledge of the rents and profits derived from
the mortgaged real estate is unenforceable by the mortgagee since
it is against the public policy of the state which vests the ex-
clusive right of possession in the mortgagor at all times prior to
decree of foreclosure and sale thereunder.
2. That the mortgagee, as against the mortgagor in possession
and those deriving title under him subsequent to the mortgage, is
not entitled to a receiver, pendente lite, to collect the rents and
profits and apply same on any deficiency in the mortgage indebt-
edness arising by reason of the inadequacy of the mortgaged real
estate or the insolvency of the mortgagor.
3. That a stipulation in a mortgage that on default, a receiver
or a receiver of rents and profits may be appointed, is contrary
to the public policy of the state as shown by Rem. C. S. 804 (P C.
7530), and therefore void.
4. That Rem. C. S. 804 (P C. 7530) has the effect only of chang-
mg the common law rights and remedies of the mortgagee, without
192 Wash. 608, 159 Pac. 779 (1916).
166 id. 576, 77 N. E. 1092 (1906).
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affecting his equitable remedies, and that the right, therefore, of
a mortgagee to a receiver for the preservation of his security, upon
proper cause shown, is in no manner impaired by such statute.
5. That if the mortgagor in possession or those deriving title
through him subsequent to the mortgage are permitting or com-
mitting waste of a character to impair the security, and the secur-
ity is inadequate and those personally liable for the debt are in-
solvent, a proper case has been made out for the appointment
of a receiver to take charge of the property and to apply the rents
and profits, or so much thereof as may be necessary for that
purpose, in protecting it from preventable waste, this being, in
effect, a probable exception to Rein. C. S. 804 (P C. 7530)
6. That even though for proper cause shown, a receiver may be
appointed, the matter is entirely discretionary with the Court, and
that even though the mortgage stipulates otherwise, in no case
is a mortgagee entitled, as a matter of right, to the appointment.
In conclusion, it may be said that approval should be given to
that enlightened public policy which protects the home owner in
the possession of his home, but that there is little reason or justice
in extending that public policy for the purpose of enabling the
insolvent owner of an apartment house or other business property,
who has specifically pledged the rents and income as security for
his debt, to avoid his just obligation and pocket such rents and
income during the pendency of the foreclosure action.
J. C. PEARL.
RECENT CASES
INSURANCE-CONTEST BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND MORTAGEES. A owned
a tract of land with a dwelling on it, mortgaged to B for $950.00; dwell-
ing insured for $800.00 and mortgage clause in favor of B was attached to
the policy- A, desiring to construct a store building on the land, nego-
tiated a $1600.00 loan from C, B releasing his mortgage and taking a
2nd mortgage; C's mortgage provided A should keep the buildings on
the property insured for not less than $1600.00 for the benefit of C; C
held a $2000.00 policy on the store building; it was agreed between A
and C that the insurance on the dwelling should also be changed to make
same payable to C, but this was not done, and the dwelling burned. In
a contest between B and C: Held, that B was entitled to the entire
$800.00. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company v. Edward R. Smith, A. D.
Devonshire and Capital Savzngs & Loan Assn., 70 Wash. Dec. 201, 16 Pac.
2d 202 (1932).
An insurance policy is a personal contract between insurer and in-
sured and does not pass with the property insured, Newark Fire Insurance
Co. v. Turk, 6 Fed. 2d 533, 43 A. L. R. 496 (CCA Penn. 1925) Fogg 'v.
Londorn & Promncal Marne & General Ins. Co., 237 Ky. 636, 36 S. W
2d 44 (1931) New York Underwriters V. Denson, 100 Okla. 89, 227 Pac.
124 (1924) Mercer v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 88 Or. 410, 171 Pac. 412(1918). However, a contract between mortgagor (insured) and mort-
gagee whereby the former agrees to insure for the benefit of the latter
creates an equitable lien in favor of the mortgagee in the proceeds of
insurance on the property at the time of the contract or thereafter pro-
cured by the mortgagor, enabling the mortgagee to collect the
proceeds even in absence of any mortgage clause on the policy
In re Zitron, 203 Fed. 79 (D. C. Wisc. 1913) Stebbns v. Westchester
Fire Ins. Co., 115 Wash. 623, 197 Pac. 913 (1921) 1st National Bank v.
Commerctal Union Assurance Co., 40 Idaho 236, 232 Pac. 899 (1925)
